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NEGOTIATING REPARATION RIGHTS: THE

PARTICIPATORY AND SYMBOLIC QUOTIENTS
Lisa J. Laplante*
INTRODUCTION

With each new transitional justice experience, the centrality and importance of providing reparations to victims becomes more evident. Reparations, which include both pecuniary payments and non-pecuniary goods and
services like access to health care, housing and education, are designed to
respond to the material and psychological needs of victims. They do so by
redressing serious harms caused by political violence and conflict as well as
by signaling condemnation of the underlying crimes that caused such harm.
Ethnographic research and testimonies show that victims consider reparations to be important justice measures. 1 Correspondingly, truth commissions
typically recommend that governments institute reparations programs.
When governments take up these recommendations, they nevertheless
face difficult implementation decisions. This reality is particularly true with
regard to the distribution of individualized economic reparations as a response to widespread political violence, such as that caused by apartheid,
armed conflict, repressive and authoritarian regimes, and other situations
that leave a large universe of victims with diverse types of harms and suffering. Indeed, because of the extraordinary nature of such situations, governments generally opt for large scale administrative reparation programs in
which a single quantum can be distributed to all qualified beneficiaries. Yet,
because such a quantum is generally not tailored to individual suffering and
is often significantly inferior to any civil damage award that could be expected from individual litigation, economic reparation programs always run
* Interim Director, The Thomas J. Dodd Research Center at the University of
Connecticut and Research Fellow at the University of Connecticut Law School. I
would like to thank the participants of the symposium for their thoughtful comments on
my initial presentation of this paper and to Tara Melish for her ongoing feedback
throughout the editing process. My gratitude also goes to Cristidin Correa for his generosity in sharing his own insight into this topic, and thoughtful comments on the final
draft. All opinions and possible errors are my own. Throughout this article the names of
sources have been withheld to protect their identity.
1. My own extensive ethnographic research in Peru revealed that victims consistently named reparations as one of their primary justice demands. See, e.g., Lisa J.
Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparationsin
Post-TruthCommission Peru, 29 HUM. RTs. Q. 228 (2007) (describing the demands for

reparations made by victims).

218

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

the risk of rejection by the very population they are intended to benefit: the
2
victim-survivors.
This Article explores this contemporary problem by looking at Peru's
experience with implementing a national economic reparations program.
Similar to other countries like South Korea that responded to a violent past
by forming truth commissions, Peru formed a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (PTRC) in 2001. It did so after twenty years of internal armed
conflict between the State and illegally armed subversive groups, lasting
from 1980 until 2000. As part of its post-conflict recovery effort, the PTRC
presented a comprehensive plan for a national reparations program in 2003,
which the government has been slowly implementing under the pressure of
civil society's demands. Although the reparation program constitutes only
one component of Peru's more comprehensive reconciliation efforts, it
presents an important lens into the difficulties that inevitably arise in calculating a single quantum of money that adequately responds to the needs of a
large and diverse set of victims and offers them a sense of feeling repaired.
As will be discussed in this Article, the Peruvian government's recent proposals for an economic reparation package met with great resistance and
even rejection from a large number of victim-survivors. While such difficulties can never be completely avoided, this Article proposes two ways in
which the Peruvian government could have safeguarded against this worrisome outcome. These recommendations may also serve as broader principles that may guide other governments embarking on post-conflict
economic reparation programs, including the government of South Korea.
First, the Peruvian government would have cultivated more buy-in to
its program had it guaranteed the right to participation and ongoing consultation with the intended beneficiaries. In essence, Peru's transitional justice
experience suggests that even if negotiations lead to an outcome that falls
short of victims' initial expectations or what a victim could win in court,
these potential plaintiffs are much more likely to accept a smaller quantum
if they feel they were genuinely listened to and considered in the technical
calculations. 3 Importantly, if done in a meaningful manner, the consultation
process becomes a form of reparation in itself. It provides some victims
their first positive interaction with the government, and can create institutional channels of democratic inclusion for those from groups that have
2. In choosing the term "victim-survivors" I mean to refer to those people who
suffer direct harm from a human rights violation as well as their families. This article
uses this term interchangeably with "victim" or "los afectados" (the Spanish term for
victim-survivors of Peru's internal armed conflict) to convey the strictly legal status of
someone whose legal rights were violated.
3. See discussion infra Part III.D-F.
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historically been marginalized and disempowered in society. While the negotiation process should never be a charade that disregards the input of its
beneficiaries and their advocates, government may discover that beneficiaries are far more reasonable in understanding that administrative programs by necessity will never match the type of damages won through
litigation. I refer to this aspect of the reparation program as the "participatory quotient."
Second, while negotiations may occur with regard to the actual modality and means of distributing economic reparations, it should never compromise what I call the "symbolic quotient" of economic reparation programs:
the need to acknowledge the wrongdoing and convey the State's assumption of responsibility and contrition for having caused victim harm. Even if
the government is in a position to distribute generous monetary packages, if
it does so without recognition of the violation of rights, the population will
undoubtedly question and even reject these measures. Money alone does
not symbolize an apologetic stance, but must be accompanied by statements
and acts of recognition. While some may argue that compensation contains
an inherent symbolic element of recognition, I contend that an explicit acknowledgment of wrongdoing is necessary to maximize the reparative effect and to prevent against outright beneficiary rejection of pecuniary
measures.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a general overview
of the legal basis for the right to reparation, including the role of reparations
in transitional justice and the particularly thorny set of issues that arise with
respect to the individualized economic component of post-conflict reparation plans. Part II will introduce what I call essential and critical "quotients"
in the design of a reparations program, namely the right to participation and
the symbolic aspect of economic reparations. Part HI introduces Peru's transitional justice experience and provides a critical perspective on how the
Peruvian government approached the implementation of its reparations program. Specifically, it examines how Peru failed to integrate the participatory and symbolic quotients into its economic reparations program,
thereby evoking major conflict and tension with its beneficiary population.
Part V concludes by drawing lessons from Peru's experience that may support the fuller integration of the participatory and symbolic quotients into
future economic reparation programs.
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REPARATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SETTINGS

Reparation programs have come to figure as a staple ingredient in transitional justice undertakings. 4 Priscilla Hayner comments in her recently updated authoritative text on truth commissions that only in the last decade
has there been a "significant expansion in the literature on the subject of
reparations."'5 This increase of attention reflects the growing recognition
that reparations are not just an afterthought in the quest for justice, but
rather an integral aspect of it. Nowadays countries embarking on a transitional justice path will undoubtedly need to contemplate the inclusion of
reparations along with truth commissions, trials and institutional reform.
A.

The Right to Reparation

Despite the seeming debut of reparations in the field of transitional
justice, its origin in legal and political philosophy traces back to ancient
Roman texts.6 Most national jurisdictions contemplate some form of civil
remedy, and international bodies have also developed extensive jurisprudence defining the parameters of reparations for measurable damages suffered by individual victims of human rights violations. 7 These legal systems
embrace a fundamental principle that damages flow as a natural consequence of the violation of a legal norm, reflecting the fundamental maxim
of law ubi ius, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy). 8
Dinah Shelton, legal scholar and current commissioner of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, writes that "the most common principle
in all legal systems is that a wrongdoer has an obligation to make good the
injury caused, reflecting the aim of compensatory justice."9
In the field of human rights, most major treaties recognize that when a
state violates the human rights of a person under its jurisdiction it then
assumes a new obligation to repair the harm caused by its wrongful act or
4.

PRISCILLA HAYNER,

UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE

CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS

163 (2d ed. 2010).

5. Id.

6. D.N. MacCormick, The Obligationof Reparations, in PROCEEDINGS
175 (1978).

OF THE AR-

ISTOTELIAN SOCIETY

7. See generally, Christian Tomushcat, Reparationfor Victims of Grave Human
Rights Violations, 10 TUL. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 157 (2002).

8. The English common law tradition of this doctrine was recognized in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("[lit is a settled and invariable principle in the laws

of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its
proper redress.").
9. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 60 (2d ed.,
2006).
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omission. 10 Most notably, the U.N. General Assembly approved in 2005 the
Basic Principlesand Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Survivors of Violations of InternationalHuman Rights and Humanitarian Law, which lay out specific legal contours of the State's duty to guarantee fully this right to reparation. 1 The Basic Principles establish
minimum standards that require remedies, including reparations, to be "adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate." 12 International tribunals also outline important minimum standards for reparations, as most readily seen in
the decisions issued by the Inter-American Court ("Court"), the enforce3
ment body of the American Convention on Human Rights.'
As is widely recognized, the calculation of full damages for the type of
harm suffered through serious human rights violations is often impossible
and impracticable. '4 Indeed, no reparation can truly amend for the type of
suffering caused by the violation of such fundamental rights by government
officials as the protection of life, liberty, and dignity. Despite the impossibility of accurately calculating the loss associated with serious human rights
violations, courts have elaborated methods for assessing such damages, including through evidence of lost opportunities, medical costs, and other
measurable losses that allow for a general calculation of an amount of
10. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (fl1)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 3, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967),
993 U.N.T.S. 171; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 6, G.A. Res. 2106, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965);
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 14, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/
39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 39, G.A. Res. 44/25,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). See also
Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74,
3-4, 135 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of an individual's right to legal recourse under the InterAmerican system and within democratic society generally).
11. See G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/60/509.
12. See id., principle 2.
13. The Court's reparation jurisprudence began with its first contentious case in
1989. Velisquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147 (1989). For an overview of the development of the Court's
reparation jurisprudence since 1989, see generally Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial
Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351 (2008) (providing an overview of the
Court's reparations decisions).
14. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ReparationsDecisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 157-58 (2004) (maintaining that although monetary reparations are recognized as a remedy for human rights violations, there are few instances
where victims have actually received any money).
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money along with the ordered provision of other types of rehabilitation services. The jurisprudence of the Court reflects the concept of restitutio in
integrum, which contemplates a variety of modalities to approximate making a victim whole and restoring the status quo ante, such as through restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition. 15
While this legalized model of reparatory justice serves as a rough prototype for the design of reparations programs in transitional justice projects,
ultimately these strict legal parameters must be compromised by the practical demands of transitional settings. 16 This lack of legal fidelity in transitional justice reparation programs is caused by the need to provide
reparation for hundreds, if not thousands or tens of thousands, of victims,
many of whom have suffered very different types of human rights harms
(extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, displacement, and others).
Simply put, individualized court proceedings are effectively impossible
given the sheer number of claims and, in some countries, the existence of a
corrupt or ill equipped judiciary. 17 The modality of administrative reparation plans thus now stands as the common model of transitional justice reparation processes.
B.

The Design of Administrative Reparation Plans

Truth commissions often elaborate very general, and often overly ambitious, reparation plans with a view to providing an effective remedy to
human rights victims. However, they usually leave it to the government to
figure out how actually to design and implement reparation programs-a
task that still wants for clear international standards as to procedures and
modalities. 18 In this sense, every new experience contributes to an emerging
area of international law, offering best practices and lessons learned to as15. See Velisquez-Rodrfguez, supra note 13, T 26. For a more recent discussion,
see Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, 170 (2005).
16. Professor David Gray has proposed that traditional "ordinary" tort analogies
for figuring out reparations for mass atrocities is an erroneous starting point in these
calculations given that the nature of the types of harms that transitional justice mechanisms seek to repair, which demand extraordinary justice. David C. Gray, A No-Excuse
Approach to TransitionalJustice: Reparations as Tools of ExtraordinaryJustice, 87
WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1043, 1095 (2010).
17. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparationsin the aftermath of repressionand mass violence, in My NEIGHBOR, My ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF
MASS ATROCITY

122 (2004).

18. See Pablo de Greiff, Introduction:Repairing the Past: Compensationfor Victims of Human Rights Violations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATION 1, 3, 13 (Pablo de

Greiff ed., 2006) [hereinafter

THE HANDBOOK]

(presenting case studies of different gov-
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sure that the general field develops towards a fair, equitable and just implementation of these programs.
The need for heightened attention to emerging international standards
is perhaps nowhere more salient than in the process of distributing individualized economic reparations. Such distributions typically figure as one component of a comprehensive reparation plan, which includes symbolic,
collective, and individualized pecuniary and non-pecuniary measures.' 9 To
date, the list of countries that have actually awarded economic reparations
as a part of a transitional justice administrative plan is still relatively short,
with Argentina and Chile being among the first.2 0 South Korea is among the
most recent, although its distribution plans have tended to be limited to
narrow groups of beneficiaries. 2' These case studies help to highlight that
some of the most immediate challenges in implementing economic reparation plans relate to three distinct determinations: the appropriate amount of
payment, the set of eligible beneficiaries, and the appropriate procedure for
22
distribution.
In some respects, money payments have the closest affinity to the legal
concept of civil damages in "ordinary" judicial proceedings. They require
procedures and modes of determining the appropriate and best form of payment for a legal violation of a right. Yet, as mentioned already, the nature of
transitional justice settings greatly complicates this process in light of the
vast number of victims and types of violations. Indeed, attempting to pay
money to redress a human rights violation can often generate some of the
ernments that have implemented reparation programs and assessing the challenges that
these governments have faced).
19. In choosing to focus on economic reparations, I do not wish to imply that
other types of reparations, such as collective reparations, are any less valuable. This
article focuses on the economic reparation experience because there are few case studies and legal analysis of this category of reparations. Elsewhere I have offered a more
in-depth analysis of other forms of reparations. See Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions,Reparations and the Right to Development, 10

YALE

HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 141 (2007) [hereinafter Indivisibility]; Lisa J. Laplante &
Miryam Rivera, The Peruvian Truth Commission's Mental Health Reparations:Empowering Survivors of Political Violence to Impact the Public Health Policy, 9 INT'L J.
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 137 (2006) [hereinafter Mental Health Reparations].
20. For a detailed examination of the experiences of Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Germany, Malawi, and South Africa, see THE HANDBOOK, supra note 18. Other countries
that offered some form of economic reparations include Morocco, Colombia, Ghana
and Iraq.
21. See, e.g., Tae-Ung Baik, Fairnessin TransitionalJustice Initiatives: The Case
of South Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 169 (2013).
22. Interview with Cristian Correa, Consultant, International Center for Transitional Justice (Oct. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Correa].
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thorniest of post-conflict justice issues. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo of
Argentina, for example, denounced reparations as "blood money" on the
view that they resembled payment to forget the death of their missing loved
ones.2 3 Destitute victims may not have the luxury of taking such principled
stances, but may confuse reparation payment with development responses
to poverty.2 4 Indeed, a fine line often divides the use of public monies for
development projects or programs to reduce poverty and monies compensating human rights violations, a confusion that elicits rejection from some
25
victims and their advocates.
Despite these lurking complications, governments must search for
some appropriate indicia for calculating reparation payments. Unable to
quantify the specific damages suffered by each victim who would benefit
from a reparations program, public officials must select a reasonable measure that will have some semblance of relation to the normal exercise of
calculating civil damages. Such a measure might, for example, reflect a
civil servant pension or the average daily wage multiplied by the amount of
time that passes from the initial date of victimization (to use the term in the
strictly legal sense of someone who suffers a human rights violation). In
many cases, it will be a lump sum uniformly distributed to all qualified
victims. Whatever the case, it bears repeating that the money will never
compensate fully for the harm caused by a human rights violation. 26 For
23. Brandon Hamber & Richard Wilson, Symbolic Closure through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Post-Conflict Societies, I J. HUM. RTS. 35, 45 (2002). The

Asociaci6n Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) was formed by
mothers of people who were 'disappeared' during the 'Dirty War' of the military dictatorship in Argentina between 1976 and 1983.
24. For an example of this occurrence, see Indivisibility, supra note 19, at 161.
25. Transitional justice scholars, this author included, have begun to focus more
on the importance of development in post-conflict reconstruction efforts especially
since economic inequities often underlie some of the original causes of conflict. Moreover, victims in these settings suffer from the hardship of poverty. Id. at 145. See generally

TRANSITIONAL

JUSTICE AND

DEVELOPMENT: MAKING

CONNECTIONS

(Pablo de

Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009). However, for the purposes of this article, I argue
that economic reparations should remain a wholly distinct component of a reparation
plan given the unique function they serve as a direct acknowledgment of human rights
violations. See discussion infra Part II.B (symbolic quotient discussion).
26. Laurel Fletcher, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after

Genocide andMass Violence, 19 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 428, 431 (2001) (writing that "no
market measures exist for the value of living an ordinary life"). The difficulty of measuring damages for certain types of pain and suffering has been recognized as a problem
in ordinary tort law. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placinga Priceon Pain and Suffering:
A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damagesfor Nonmonetary Injuries, 83
CAL. L. REV. 773, 778 (1995).
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that reason, economic reparations always run the risk of being outright rejected by victim-survivors, the very population they are intended to benefit.
In light of this possibility, two essential aspects must be present, I argue, for any economic reparation program to satisfy victims, even when
amounts fall short of what would be awarded using strict legal damage calculations. First, reparations programs must include what I call a "participatory quotient" that includes ongoing consultation and negotiation with
victims. Second, economic reparation programs must always include what
I call a "symbolic quotient" that reflects state acknowledgment of and assumption of responsibility for the harm caused. The next part offers a general explanation of these criteria.

II.
A.

CRITICAL QUOTIENTS IN THE REPARATIVE JUSTICE EQUATION

The ParticipatoryQuotient

In general, any government's reparation program should plan for and
assure the full participation of those intended to benefit from reparative
measures like economic compensation. The instructive principle underlying
this participatory quotient arises out of both a normative foundation and
practical considerations. With regard to the former, the right to participation
threads through the general field of international human rights law, especially when it concerns interests that directly impact the lives and wellbeing of individuals and communities. There is a growing body of scholarship by practitioners and academics espousing the importance of the right to
participation in regard to special categories of persons and a wide array of
activities, including displaced populations, 27 housing, 28 persons with disabilities, 29 indigenous people, 30 minorities, 31 the elderly, 32 and the environ27. See, e.g., Jeremy Grace & Erin Mooney, PoliticalParticipationRights in Particular the Right to Vote, in

INCORPORATING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL

DISPLACEMENT INTO DOMESTIC LAW: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

507 (Walter KAlin et al.

eds., 2010).
28. See, e.g., Ralph Wolf, Participationin the Right ofAccess to Adequate Hous-

ing, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 269, 270 (2006-07).
29. See, e.g., Thorsten Afflerbach & Angela Garabagiu, Council of Europe Actions to Promote Human Rights and Full Participationof People with Disabilities:Improving the Quality of Life of People with Disabilitiesin Europe, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 463, 464 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Saeko Kawashima, The Right to Effective Participationand the Ainu
People, 1 INT'L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 21, 22 (2004).
31. See, e.g., Annelies Verstichel, Recent Developments in the UN Human Rights
Committee's Approach to Minorities,with a Focus on Effective Participation,12 INT'L
J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 25, 26 (2005).
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ment, 33

among others. Numerous international instruments concerning
human rights likewise recognize the right to participation, most notably article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 25 of the
34
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Against this backdrop, the international human rights movement has
begun to focus more squarely on the instrumental value of a participatory
approach to the design, implementation and monitoring of policies, practices and programs that directly affect core substantive rights in vital areas
of human life. 35 Professor Tara Melish, for example, has explored the importance of participation with relation to the "new governance" and "new
accountability" movements, each of which recognizes participation as a
critical ingredient to effective public policy making, on both instrumental
and dignitary grounds. 36 These approaches are based on a view that stakeholders have a "genuine right to meaningfully influence or share control
over budgetary priority-setting, substantive policy-making and assessment,
resource allocation, and ensuring fair and equitable access to public goods
and services. '37 In theory, effective participation results in policies and public agendas that respond better and more directly to the real needs and pri32. See, e.g., Sarah Moses, A Just Society for the Elderly: The Importanceof Justice as Participation,21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 335, 347-48 (2007)
(discussing U.N. standards for participation of the elderly).
33. See, e.g., Kerry Kumabe, The Public'sRight of Participation:Attaining Environmental Justice in Hawai'i through Deliberative Decisionmaking, 17 ASIAN AMER.
L.J. 181, 182 (2010) (discussing a civic republican model of participation); Jacqueline
Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues
for Participationby NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and
World Trade Organization, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 47, 48 (2001).
34. See also African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13, June 27,
1981,21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 23(a), Nov. 22,
1969 O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Protocol to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213
U.N.T.S. 262; Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, art. 7(1), June 27, 1989, 72 I.L.O. Official Bull. 59 (entered into force Sept.
5, 1991); Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Dec. 21, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517,
2161U.N.T.S. 447.
35. Martin Abregd, Human Rights for All: From the Struggle AgainstAuthoritarianism to the Constructionof an All-Inclusive Democracy - A View from the Southern
Cone and Andean Region, 58 SUR - INT'L J. HuM. RTS. 7, 8 (2008).
36. Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participationof the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2010).
37. Id. at 74.

2012]

Negotiating ReparationRights

orities of stakeholders by taking the opinions and proposals of local
populations into account.
The instrumental role of participation is indeed recognized in numerous areas of human rights law. For example, the right to participation is
recognized as a first principle in assuring the realization of the right to
health, enshrined in article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 38 Interpreting that provision, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has recognized that meaningful participation in decision-making and monitoring processes is not only a
valued right in itself, but also provides the most effective means of holding
the state accountable for the fulfillment of the right to health. 39 Participation, in this regard, is viewed as increasing the populations' control over
their health, allowing them to better "reach a state of complete physical,
' '4°
mental and social well-being.
In light of the centrality of the participatory quotient in many areas of
life that enjoy human rights protections, it thus comes as no surprise that the
imperative of participation would figure as an important component of reparation processes in post-conflict and transitional justice settings. 4' In fact,
38. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementationof the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights,
11, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12.2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
39. Id. [43(d).
40. Id. 11. The right to participation also figures into development theory. Article I of the Declaration on the Right to Development establishes that "The right to
development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and
all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social,
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms
can be fully realized" Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, Annex (Dec. 4, 1986) (emphasis added).
41. Due to growing attention to the importance of participation, transitional justice
scholars and practitioners have recently begun to focus on the issue of local participation in transitional justice mechanisms in general, with a few narrowing in on reparations in particular. See, e.g., Millar Hayli, Facilitating Women's Voices in Truth
Recovery: An assessmentof women's participationand the integrationof a gender perspective in truth commissions, in LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR

(Durham Helen & Gurd Trace eds., 2008); Lisa J. Laplante, The Process of the Peruvian Truth Commission's Historical Memory Project: Empowering Truth Tellers to
Confront Truth Deniers,6 HuM. RTS. J. 433 (2007) [hereinafter Memory Project];Lisa
J. Laplante, Women as PoliticalParticipants:Peru'sApproach to Psychosocial PostConflict Recovery, 13 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCH. 313 (2007); Ezekiel Pajibo,
Civil Society and TransitionalJustice in Liberia:A Practitioner'sReflection from the
Field, I INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 287 (2007); Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern,
Whose Justice: Rethinking TransitionalJustice from Bottom up, 35 J.L. Soc'Y 265
(2008); Patrick Vinck & Phuong Pham, Ownership and Participationin Transitional
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the importance of participation was recently recognized in the 2011 report
of the Secretary General of the United Nations, which declares:
Robust national consultations are now understood to be essential prerequisites to ensure that transitional justice mechanisms reflect the
needs of conflict-affected communities, including victims. There is
also growing evidence that transitional justice measures that evolve
over time and involve strong national ownership result in greater po42
litical stability in post-conflict settings.
The report goes on to recognize that reparation programs, in particular, may
be seen as a way to "strengthen victims' participation in reconstruction efforts. '43 The U.N. statement reflects the growing insistence of transitional
justice advocates in stressing the utmost importance of consulting communities so they are heard in meaningful ways regarding plans for societal

Justice Mechanisms: A Sustainable Human Development Perspective from Eastern
DRC, 2 INT'L J.TRANSITIONAL JUST 398 (2008); Matiangai Sirleaf, Regional Approach
to TransitionalJustice? Examining the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone and the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission for Liberia, 21 FLA. J. INT'L L. 209 (2009); Wendy
Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence, 3 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009); Cristidn Correa, Julie Guillerot & Lisa Magarrell, Reparationsand Victim Participation:A Look at the Truth Commission Experience, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:

385 (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz
& Alan Stephens eds., 2009); Anna Triponel & Stephen Pearson, What Do You Think
Should Happen - Public Participationin TransitionalJustice, 22 PACE INT'L L. REV.
103 (2010); Susan Harris Rimmer, Sexing the Subject of TransitionalJustice, 32 AUST.
FEMINIST L. J. 123 (2010); Emily Haslam, Subjects and Objects: InternationalCriminal
Law and the Institutionalizationof Civil Society, 5 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST 221
(2011). While there is still limited study on the topic of participation specifically related
to the design of reparation programs, the Social Science Research Council's edited volume on the role of women in reparations programs offers an excellent comparative view
SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING

with a specific gender focus. See, e.g., Beth Goldblatt, Evaluating the Gender Content
of Reparations:Lessons from South Africa, in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN? GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 48 (Ruth Rubio-Marin ed.,
2006); Heidy Rombouts, Women and Reparationsin Rwanda: A Long Path to Travel,
in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN?, supra, at 194; Galuh Wandita et al., Learning to
Engender Reparations in Timor-Leste: Reaching Out to Female Victims, in WHAT
HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN?, supra, at 284.
42. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Rule of Law
18, U.N. Doc. S/
and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies

2011/634 (Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Rule of Law Report].
43. Id. [26.
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reconstruction. 4 The general message here is that if a transitional justice
mechanism is to be for affected populations, it must be by them.4 5 This
sentiment is especially relevant for the design and implementation of reparation programs that distribute individualized monetary reparations. 46
As elaborated further in the next two sections, the reason participation
contributes so instrumentally to the success of an economic compensation
program is two-fold. On the one hand, it promotes the legitimacy of the
reparation package by fostering beneficiary buy-in and willingness to compromise. On the other, it supports more macro-level, democracy building
initiatives in society at large, both by helping to re-integrate formerly disenfranchised populations into the polity and by promoting better government
responses to the structural inequalities that often cause conflict and political
violence in the first place.
1. The Legitimizing Effect of Participation
The participatory quotient borrows its theoretical bases from the concept of deliberative democracy, an academic area that enjoys a solid body
of scholarship too extensive to review here, 47 but whose focus on consultation, public participation and civic engagement should inform the evolving
conversation in the transitional justice field. In particular, it is helpful to
consider how participation, as a procedural method, takes as its starting
point that "citizens want to have a say in matters which affect them, complemented by the policy makers' quest to legitimate their actions. ' '48 Similarly, the success of any transitional justice project rests greatly on it being
perceived as legitimate by the public. As argued by Professor Jaya Ramji44. Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B. L. King, Beyond TraditionalNotions of
TransitionalJustice: How Trials, Truth Commissions,andOther Tools for Accountability Can and Should Work Together, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 94 (2007).
45. Id.

46. See Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdotir, A PsychologicalPerspectiveon Compensationfor Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53
DEPAUL

L. REV. 355, 375-76 (2003) (noting that procedural fairness should include the

participation of beneficiaries).
47. See generally JOHN S.

DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND:

(2000); Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANN. REV. POL. ScI. 307 (2003); Nancy Roberts, Public Deliberation
in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation,34 AM. REv. PUB. ADMIN. 315 (2004); Dennis F Thompson, DeliberativeDemocratic Theory and Empirical PoliticalScience, 11
ANN. REV. POL. Sc!. 497 (2008).
48. Lyn Carson & Ron Lubensky, Raising Expectationsof DemocraticParticipation: An Analysis of the National Human Rights Consultation, 33 U.N.S.W.L.J. 34, 43
LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS

(2010).
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Nogales, "[i]f an institution is viewed as legitimate, actors will defer to its
decisions even when they disagree with the substance of these decisions
."49 Given this reality, she recommends that the design process for
transitional justice mechanisms be participatory and inclusive to increase
perceptions of their legitimacy. 50 The United Nations has likewise recognized that perceptions of legitimacy constitute one of the most important
51
factors in the overall success of transitional justice activities.
With respect to reparations, the perceived legitimacy of a government's program is particularly critical because it promotes beneficiary buyin to an economic package that will inevitably involve amounts less than
could be achieved through individualized civil litigation remedies. Beneficiary buy-in in this respect can help prevent the type of outright rejection and
public disavowal that would devastate any well-intentioned program. Indeed, as the case of Peru illustrates, we already have country examples in
which victim-survivors rejected reparation plans that were elaborated without their input, creating political tensions that threatened the very viability
of the reparation program and efforts to repair the past.5 2 The participatory
quotient can thus increase the likelihood that beneficiaries will ultimately
accept the government's program even if it results in payments that are
lower than desired or that fail to compensate fully for the actual harm suffered. In short, it enables beneficiaries to accept what might be considered
"compromised justice."
This prophylactic effect of participation rests on the fact that the "purpose of dialogue is neither to attain an absolute consensus nor to reach a
universal principle, but to recognize differences and similarities and to
reach agreements where participants can agree, whilst still preserving their
differences. '53 As active and respected participants, beneficiaries may be
willing to negotiate the terms of their general right to reparation, without
actually undermining the general sanctity of that right. Assuring the full,
free and informed consent of beneficiaries to the negotiated content of economic reparation programs also guards against generating new harms which
could potentially undermine reparative justice initiatives. That is, if victims
are involved in the ongoing discussion of feasible and fair parameters for
reparations, they will be more inclined to accept less than they could no49. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, DesigningBespoke TransitionalJustice: A PluralistProcess Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (2010).

50. Id. at 61.
51. See Rule of Law Report, supra note 42, at 3-4; see also Anna Triponel &
Stephen Pearson, What Do You Think Should Happen? Public Participationin Transitional Justice, 103 PACE INT'L L. REV. 22, 108 (2010).
52. See discussion infra Part IV.
53. Kawashima, supra note 30, at 25.
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tionally win through litigation and yet not view this compromised amount
as a new violation of their legal right to reparation.
2.

The Reparative and Democracy Building Effect of Participation

Equally important, the process of negotiating the parameters of a compromised reparation program directly contributes to the democracy building
aspects of reconstruction efforts in post-conflict settings. Indeed, a healthy
democracy is one "marked by willing and active public participation. '54
Participants in democracy must develop a healthy tolerance for political
contestation and bargains, "the hallmark of successful democracy." 55 In the
course of developing the habits of citizenship, participation in reparation
programs thus institutionalizes new channels for inclusive dialogue with affected populations, which can in turn lead to better responses to their needs.
Importantly, this sensitivity to local preferences also assures that transitional justice architects do not succumb to the temptation of adopting a "one
size fits all" approach, but rather craft their respective responses to the
unique demands and challenges of country specific contexts. 56
At the same time, the citizen-building aspect of the participatory quotient contains an inherent reparative effect because it recognizes and treats
the formerly marginalized as equal citizens under the law, a process that can
restore dignity and empower the formerly voiceless.57 Consultation is the
constitutive act that restores full citizenship. Having a role in designing a
reparation program gives its beneficiaries a stake in the process while also
allowing them to reclaim space to be equal and respected constituents in the
public domain. 58 In this way, participation forms the cornerstone of a
"transformative justice" process, promoting a cultural shift that is the true
glue for holding together a new political and legal system. 59
54. Carson & Lubensky, supra note 48, at 45; see generally Carmen Malena,
Building Political Willfor ParticipatoryGovernance:An Introduction, inFROM POLITICAL WON'T TO POLITICAL WILL: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

3 (Carmen Malena ed., 2009) (regarding the importance of active public participation).
55. Marcus J. Kurtz, The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons
from Latin America, 56 WORLD POLITICS 263, 302 (2004).
56. See generally Erin Daly, TransformativeJustice: Chartinga Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 73, 77 (2001-02) (warning against creating "TRC

clones" and instead to focus on "contextuality" since each country's transitional path
will be a "unique constellation" of a variety of social, historical and other factors) [hereinafter Daly, Transformative Justice]; Ramji-Nogales, supra note 49.
57.
Eyes of
58.
59.

Lisa J. Laplante, Evaluating Truth Commissions and Reparations through the
Victims, 28 L'OBSERVATEUR DES NATIONS UNIES 167 (2010-11).
Mental Health Reparations,supra note 19.
Daly, supra note 56, at 100.
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In this setting, using participation to address power paradigms makes
particular sense considering that it is usually political and economic
marginalization and disempowerment that makes certain populations more
vulnerable to becoming victims of human rights violations in the first
place. 60 Political violence communicates to its victims that they are less
than human; that they are sub-citizens. Participatory engagement that gives
meaningful voice to the historically underserved, if followed by concrete
government measures, establishes some equilibrium in power relations
since it can be used as a "means of building the political power required to
ensure that the interests of the poor [a]re in fact adequately represented in
institutional decisionmaking." 61 Assuring a sufficient participatory quotient
at each stage of the design and implementation of a reparations program can
thus help the historically marginalized to "cast off notions of their 'inability' or 'dependence,' and instead compel the public and government actors
to see them as human beings with dignity, agency, and a drive to be treated
on the basis of equal opportunity - not charity or paternalism." 62 Orchestrating opportunities to deliberate over reparation packages gives victimsurvivors citizen status-that is, voice and vote on matters central to their
lives-and ultimately constitutes a form of political restitution.
Accordingly, the participatory quotient has both instrumental and intrinsic value. As Melish notes, it can function to ensure "program adaptability and responsiveness" while also serving as a "means of building the
dignity, confidence, and initiative required to sustain proactive engagement
in community self-help initiatives. ' 63 Yet, this paradigm requires a not so
easy shift in the concept of "victims" as entitled beneficiaries, especially
where such victims come from marginalized and impoverished sectors.
Economist Amartyr Sen has recognized that these populations are not passive and mere recipients of external decisions, but rather have the right to
be active constructors of policies designed to overcome their conditions of
poverty. 64 The participatory quotient thus builds off of Sen's "capability
65
approach" by addressing the root causes of the poor's disempowerment.
60. See id.
61. Melish, Maximum FeasibleParticipation,supra note 36, at 21 (describing one
of four primary rationales underlying "maximum feasible participation" paradigm in
1964 Economic Opportunity Act).
62. Id. at 14-15 (describing core aims of modem new accountability movement).
63. Id. at 18 (describing additional rationales for participatory paradigm in 1964
Economic Opportunity Act).
64. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 77-79 (1995) (discussing
equality of opportunity and economic inequality).
65. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 117-18 (2011).
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Given that disempowerment and poverty persist after ceasefires and pose
one of the greatest challenges to the very process of national recovery, implementation of the participatory quotient may be crucial to reconciliation
efforts and victim repair.
B.

The Symbolic Quotient

The participatory quotient does not, however, signify that beneficiaries
should willingly bargain away their right to receive acknowledgment of the
wrongs caused them by government acts and omissions. On the contrary,
reparations should be accompanied by symbolic acts of contrition, such as
public statements by officials recognizing that reparation payments arise out
of the government's legal responsibility for rights violations.
Some view the simple act of awarding monetary compensation, even
without affirmative official statements, as "a symbolic attempt to acknowledge past injustices and the suffering of victims." 66 Social scientists Roman
David and Susanne Choi Yuk-ping, writing on the experience of economic
reparations in the Czech Republic, for example, posit that "[m]oney symbolizes the irrevocable admission that a crime has been committed. It allows a feeling of closure. '67 This view posits that the very act of offering
reparation constitutes "a clear public recognition that injustice did happen,
that it should not have happened, and that it must not be forgotten." 68 On
this view, the aim of pecuniary measures is not only to redress financial or
material losses, "but also to provide symbolic expression of guilt and regret
and to offer an unqualified and unambiguous apology to those who suffered
the injustice." 69 Such emphasis on the intrinsic symbolism of monetary
compensation echoes the expressive theory of law, which recognizes the
value of the statement-making and symbolic utility of government legal
70
actions.
66. Roman David & Susanne Choi Yuk-ping, Victims on TransitionalJustice:
Lessonsfrom the Reparationof Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic, 27 HUM.
RTS. Q. 392, 404 (2005).
67. Natan Sznaider, Money andJustice: Toward a Social Analysis of Reparations,
3 HUM. RTS. REV. 104, 109 (2002).
68. Frank Haldemann, Another Kind of Justice: TransitionalJustice as Recognition, 41 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 675, 728 (2008) (citing JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY

98 (1970)).

69. Id. at 728-29.
70. For more discussion on the importance of symbolism when reparation payments are inferior to what might be won in court, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al.,
Symbolism and Incommensurabilityin Civil Sanctions: DecisionMakers as Goal Man-

agers,68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (2003) ("The law functions expressively to the
extent that its role is more symbolic than instrumental, as it focuses on 'making state-
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Yet, the symbolism of money payments is distinguishable from the
legal category of "symbolic reparations," which includes non-pecuniary
measures intended to offer dignity-restoring effects.7 1 Monuments, street
signs, and other memory projects fall into this general category of reparations, while apologies perhaps best epitomize the purpose of symbolic reparations. 72 Professor Frank Haldemann offers important insight into "the
significance of what we might call reparatorysymbolism as a necessary
additional step toward acknowledging wrongdoing, breaking with an atrocity and its legacy, and thus restoring the dignity of the victims as fullfledged, equal citizens. 7 3 Yet, simply saying "sorry" is also not enough if
there is no accompanying articulation of the reasons for such apology. Instead, a collective or institutional apology requires "acknowledg[ing]
wrongdoing and thereby also acknowledg[ing] the human dignity and legitimate feelings of those wronged. ' 74 This ritualistic "discursive core" fulfills
the symbolic quotient in a formula of economic reparations while also max75
imizing their reparative effect.
Highlighting a symbolic quotient thus enhances the efficacy and viability of economic reparations. Sociology professor John Torpey speaks of
the intertwined relationship between apology and compensation. If monetary compensation lacks explicit reference to its purpose of redressing past
wrongs, it may fail to address the moral indignation of victims. In turn, they
may reject the reparation program outright. At the same time, an apology
may appear to be "cheap talk" if not accompanied by concrete measures,
ments'"). For commentary more generally on the expressive function of law, see Cass
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022, 2051
(1996); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
GeneralRestatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory ofExpressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (2000); Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 760 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U.

L. REv. 591, 592-93 (1996); ELIZABETH
(1993).
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 125, 137 (2000).

CHI.

ANDERSON, VALUE IN

ETHICS AND ECONOMICS

71. RUTi

TEITEL,

72. Antkowiak, supra note 13, at 361. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
consistently orders these types of public announcements of wrongdoing at the same
time that it orders governments to pay economic compensation for human rights
violations.
73. Haldemann, supra note 68, at 730.
74. Trudy Govier & Wilhelm Verwoerd, The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology, 33
J.Soc. PHIL. 67 (2002).
75. Haldemann, supra note 68, at 727 (citing R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
79-82 (2001)).

NICATION, AND COMMUNITY
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such as reparations. 76 On the same point, scholar Elazar Barkan describes
how Japan's unwillingness to admit guilt regarding its use of comfort women "depreciated the economic value of the compensation [offered] and
made it valueless." 77 Any amount of economic reparations, even significant
78
amounts, will lose their reparative value without this symbolic quotient.
Instead, payments may be viewed as mere humanitarian assistance, development or other types of aid wholly disconnected from the principle of
79
corrective justice.
Significantly, the symbolic quotient also contributes to macro-level reform by meeting the "requirements of legal justice" and the rule of law. It
establishes victims as "equal right-bearers, who are able to make claims,"
thus reinforcing principles of equality before the law. 80 A "decent society,"
in this regard, assures that institutional practices and measures treat all subjects as members of the human community, with status of equal worth. 81
"[These] ...symbolic gestures, or rituals, are significant as ways of expressing a society's very commitment to include the previously excluded and
'82
oppressed as fully recognized members of the polity.
Indeed, it is through the process of recognition that economic reparations create a reparative effect. Haldemann explores this "phenomenology
of recognition," and argues it should stand as a central principle in the transitional justice field. 83 He relies on the writings of Axel Honneth, who
frames recognition as a form of justice since it meets the "human need for
relations of mutual recognition as a precondition for achieving a distinctively human sense of self-realization." 84 Thus, in situations of grave human
rights abuse, the moral harm caused by humiliation, disrespect, and indiffer76. John Torpey, Introduction:Politics and the Past,in POLITICS AND THE PAST:
ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES 23 (John Torpey ed., 2003).
77. Haldemann, supra note 68, at 730 (citing ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF
NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES

352 (2000)).

78. See Erin Daly, Reparationsin South Africa: A CautionaryTale, 33 U. MEM.
L. REV. 367, 384 (2003) (writing on victims' negative reaction to reparations without
proper acknowledgement of the harm they seek to repair).
79. See Lisa J. Laplante, TransitionalJustice and Peace Building:Diagnosingand
Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework,
2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 331, 331-33 (2008).
80. Haldemann, supra note 68, at 704-05. See also Jonathan Allen, BalancingJustice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 315. 332 (1999).
81. Axel Honneth, Recognition and Moral Obligation, 64 Sos. RES. 16, 17-18
(1997).
82. Haldemann, supra note 68, at 722.
83. Id. at 681.
84. Id. at 683.

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

ence communicates that the victim does not matter in the greater scheme of
things. Trudy Govier terms this mistreatment as "misrecognition" or "non
recognition," 85 and views it as damaging to self-respect and healthy human
agency; in essence it denies a person his or her very humanness. Misrecognition may continue when governments-even new regimes-main86
tain policies to cover up or deny past wrongdoing.
Reparations which lack the symbolic quotient may thus become a new
form of misrecognition. As Haldemann writes, "[o]ne obvious danger is
that the perspective of the victimized, their sense of injustice or humiliation,
may be ignored or not appropriately taken into account. '87 Reparations implemented in silence cause new harms: "In cases of outright denial or partial acknowledgment, the initial wound of insult and humiliation develops
into 'the second wound of silence' - a deep sense of hurt stemming from
the feeling that 'people condone the wrongs and do not care about the baneful results. '88 This 'second-wounding' may even undermine the critical participatory quotient elaborated in the last section since, "[w]hen recognition
is withheld, victims of injustice are subjected to the symbolic injury of being ignored-of being rendered passive, powerless, voiceless, or simply invisible in matters that deeply affect them as human beings." 89 On the
contrary, public acknowledgment and restoration of victims' citizen-status
assures the recognition and even amends misrecognition, thereby preserving
the reparative effect of economic compensation. Thus, as with the participatory quotient, I argue, beneficiaries will only accept a negotiated
amount of reparation if it retains the symbolic aspect of acknowledging
moral and legal responsibility for the wrongs committed, and recognition of
those harmed.
The importance of both the participatory and symbolic quotients is
clearly evidenced in Peru's transitional justice experience, particularly in
the nation's experience with implementing economic reparations. The following Part describes that experience, demonstrating how attention to the
two quotients might have increased stakeholder buy-in and avoided beneficiary rejection of the government's proposed plan.

85. Id. at 693.
86. Memory Project,supra note 41, at 435.

87. Haldemann, supra note 68, at 692.
88. Trudy Govier, What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important? in
MAS OF RECONCILIATION: CASES AND CONCEPTS

DILEM-

85 (Carol A. L. Prager &Trudy Govier

eds., 2003).
89. See J.M. Bernstein, Suffering Injustice: Misrecognition as Moral Injury in

CriticalTheory, 13

INT'L J. PHIL. STUD.

303, 311 (2005).
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IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC REPARATIONS IN PERU: THE
MISSING PARTICIPATORY AND SYMBOLIC QUOTIENTS

A.

Peru's TransitionalJustice Experience

The possibility of transitional justice in Peru appeared suddenly in
2000 through the fortuitous flight, amidst a corruption scandal, of authoritarian leader Alberto Fujimori. The human rights community was nevertheless well poised to push this political agenda forward. In particular, even at
the height of Fujimori's clamp down on Peruvian society, human rights
activists had begun to formulate and articulate their demands for accountability through a truth commission. 90
Peru formed its Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2001 in the
context of the power vacuum left by Fujimori's departure. The transitional
government formed an advisory committee composed of many human
rights activists, which began to map out how the government would address
the massive human rights violations that occurred not only under Fujimori's
dictatorial rule, but also during the internal armed conflict that began in
1980 between the government's security sector and insurgent groups. Accepting the committee's proposal of a truth commission, the government
issued an executive decree establishing the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereinafter "PTRC"). 91
Charged with investigating the causes, consequences, and responsibilities of political violence and the human rights violations that resulted from
it, the PTRC labored for two years, presenting its Final Report in August
2003. The Report, estimating a death toll of close to 70,000 Peruvians, offers detailed information on emblematic cases of the many different types
of human rights violations that occurred over the two decades falling within
its mandate, including the widespread use of techniques to disappear, torture, unjustly imprison, extrajudicially kill, and massively displace populations. The Report also examines the underlying causes of Peru's internal
armed conflict, including social, political, and economic inequalities that
led to historical marginalization. The PTRC dedicated significant text to
documenting the experience of the majority of victims, and how they came
from the poorest and most marginalized sectors of society.
90. See Rebecca Root, Through the Window of Opportunity: The TransitionalJustice Network in Peru, 31 HUM. RTs. Q. 452, 465-66 (2009) (providing background on

Peruvian civil society's role in the formation of a truth commission).
91. Although initially established as the Peruvian "Truth Commission," the government of President Alejandro Toledo later expanded the name of the commission to
include the idea of "reconciliation."
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As part of its conclusions, the PTRC recommended a comprehensive
program of reparations: El Plan Integral de Reparaciones (Integral Program
of Reparations or "PIR"). The team formed to elaborate the PIR did so
successfully by investing substantial energy into consulting with and collecting the input of the program's future beneficiaries. For example, collaborating with human rights organizations, the team organized nineteen
regional workshops that convened 846 victims to discuss their ideas about
reparations. 92 As a follow-up, the team convened a national meeting, inviting victim-survivors to meet for intense all-day brainstorming sessions in
which they shared what they believed would be necessary to include in a
reparation program. These meetings also included open forums for the victim-survivors to dialogue with the team regarding questions, uncertainties,
and even complaints about the drafting of the PIR. The team also worked
closely with local non-governmental organizations who interface regularly
with victims groups to gather their perceptions of the PIR and to mediate
conversations with the PTRC. These efforts culminated with victims groups
approving the document Basic criteriafor the design of a reparationspro93
gramme in Peru, which, in turn, formed the basis of the PIR.
The team also studied the experiences of other truth commissions to
get general ideas for constructing a reparation plan. In the end, the PTRC
recommended one of the most comprehensive and ambitious reparation programs ever proposed. Not only did it take a very inclusive approach by
integrating the many different categories of human rights violations, but
also adopted a holistic approach to reparations. The PIR thus included both
an economic component as well as non-pecuniary types of goods and services, such as health care, access to education and housing, and the opportunity for legal restitution, such as the clearing of false records of terrorist
activity, the issuance of certificates of disappearance to enable the settlement of inheritance issues, and other legal matters. It likewise contemplated
not only symbolic but also collective reparations.
With regard to economic reparations, pensions and indemnification
were recommended for four priority groups of victim-survivors: widowed
spouses over fifty and their children under eighteen; persons rendered partially or completely disabled (mentally or physically) due to physical violence, torture or wounding during the internal armed conflict; persons
wrongly imprisoned and later found to be innocent; and victims of rape and

92. Correa et al., supra note 41, at 402 n. 22; Interview with Correa, supra note
22.
93. Interview with Correa, supra note 22.

2012]

Negotiating Reparation Rights

their resulting offspring. 94 Despite large gaps in coverage, the selective entitlement to individualized economic reparation has nonetheless appeared to
95
result in general acceptance among organized victims groups.
Importantly, the PTRC recognized the reparative effect of the process
of implementing the PIR. Indeed, with a mandate that included decentralization, overcoming poverty, and generating wider citizen participation as
explicit goals, 96 the PTRC envisioned the PIR as a strategy for realigning
the relationship between victims and the state. As its first task, it called for
the participation of victim-survivors in the implementation of the PIR. The
PTRC adopted this strategy as both a means and an end for addressing the
underlying structural inequalities that it found contributed to the outbreak of
violence. As the Commission explained in its report, the PTRC "incorporates as a basic criteria the participation of the population in decision-making and definitions of their own process of social, cultural, economic, and
material construction and reconstruction. ' '97 In fact, through its testimony
taking, as well as by convening victim-survivors to consult on the development of the PIR, the PTRC created one of the first official transitional justice experiences of direct participation of survivors. Perhaps for this reason,
one tends to find a high rate of acceptance among survivors of the PIR,
despite its negotiated nature. 98
B.

Toward Implementation: Peru's Halting Uptake of the PIR

Almost immediately following the conclusion of the PTRC's work, the
government began to take piecemeal measures to implement the PIR. Individual ministers and regional governments spearheaded pilot programs in
health, education and symbolic reparations. However, these efforts appeared ad hoc and not centrally planned or coordinated. In July 2005, after
an extensive period of debate, the Peruvian Congress enacted an implementation law for the PIR with the objective of establishing "the normative
94.

CoMIsiON DE LA VERDAD

Y RECONCILIACION

[PERU],

INFORME FINAL VOl.

IX, 190-93 (2003) [hereinafter PTRC FINAL REPORT: REPARATIONS], availableat http:/
/www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php.
95. This observation is based on my own extensive field research in Peru, which
included interviews with victim-survivors as well as review of their position papers. I at
no time encountered outright rejection of PIR in its final form. Moreover, victims
groups have relied on PIR as their lobbying platform for pushing for the passage of
reparations laws, evidencing a wide acceptance of its content. Colleagues engaged in
the reparations process in Peru have corroborated this general observation. See Correa
et al., supra note 41, at 385; Interview with Correa, supra note 22.
96. PTRC FINAL REPORT: REPARATIONS, supra note 94, at 102.
97. Id. at 157-58.
98. See supra note 95.
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framework for the [Plan] ...in conformity with the conclusions and recommendations of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission." 99 The government also established a Consejo de Reparaciones
(National Reparations Council) charged with creating an official registry of
victims, el Registro Unico. The Reparations Council assumed the difficult
task of identifying and certifying victims to determine who would be eligible for the benefits laid out in the PIR. Additionally, the government
formed a high-level national commission charged with overseeing the implementation of the PIR in general, the Comisi6n Multisectorial de Alto
Nivel or "CMAN."
Finally, in 2007, the new government of Alan Garcia began to implement one of the many components of the PIR: collective reparations. The
President inaugurated the program from a stadium in Huanta, which had
been used as a military base and where many victims met their final fate. As
of the time of writing, the government had financed a little over a thousand
collective reparation programs, with thousands more projects waiting approval and financing. 100 Although acknowledging the importance of collective reparations, civil society and victims groups called into question the
fact that the government delayed entirely any effort to distribute individual
economic reparations, also contemplated by the law. The government's
most popular explanation for this omission related to the slow work of the
Reparations Council in registering eligible victims. This excuse was nevertheless viewed as a pretext for lack of political will, especially since the
Garcia government stopped funding the Council in 2008, eventually causing it to shut its doors until intense pressure from civil society pushed the
government to resume funding. After much delay, CMAN suddenly announced in January 2011 that it was working on its plan for economic reparations, designating US$7.2 million for individual reparations. 10 1
As a way of facilitating the implementation of individual economic
reparations, Peru's Council of Ministers convened a "Technical Commis99. Ley que Crea el Programa Integral de Reparaciones [Law Creating the Integral
Program of Reparations (PIR)], Law No.28592 (Jul. 29, 2005), availableat http://www.
idl.org.pe/educa/PIR/28592.pdf.
100. For a comprehensive report detailing the history of collective reparations in
Peru, as well as a preliminary evaluation of its effectiveness, see ICTJ & APRODEH,
PERO:

,CUANTO SE HA

REPARADO EN NUESTRAS

COMUNIDADES?

AVANCES,

PERCEP-

(2007-11)
(2011), available at http://ictj.org/publication/per%C3%BA-%C2%BFcu%C3%Alntose-ha-reparado-en-nuestras-comunidades.
101. Congreso anuncia reparacionesa victimas de la violencia, LA REPUBLICA,
Jan. 17, 2011, available at http://www.larepublica.pe/17-01-201 1/congreso-anunciareparaciones-victimas-de-la-violencia.
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sion" to study how the process should proceed, an endeavor overseen by the
director of CMAN. The director publically cautioned: "The amounts have
to be realistic but we are not putting a price tag on life and we don't want
the victims to 'sell' their loved ones ..
We want to make viable and
'
0 2
sustainable the payment of a forgotten debt."' With those words, he set the
tone of the political process whose purpose was to set parameters for calculating fair economic payments that would not be rejected by beneficiaries,
and yet whose quantum would necessarily fall beneath what could ordinarily be won through individual civil damages litigation.
C.

Limited Outreach to Beneficiaries

Human rights organizations working with beneficiaries immediately
recognized that the primary political fight regarding individual economic
reparations would center on identifying an amount that would be as "homogeneous" as possible given the large number of victims, from different origins, with different types of claims, and all with a past experience of
political and social exclusion. The CMAN director agreed that the "homogeneous" criteria should be adopted to avoid resentment. Yet agreement
stopped there. A heated debate on the appropriate parameters for economic
reparations ensued.
In January 2011, CMAN's Technical Commission began to convene
workshops with los afectados, yet posed only two questions: How much do
you expect in terms of economic reparations? And, what will you spend the
money on? Observers expressed concern that this poll was slanted and
failed to capture the "demanda organizada" because it left out the more
organized groups of victim-survivors in urban centers, focusing instead on
the response of (predominantly male) rural community leaders, many of
whom were not even informed about the meaning of reparations. 0 3 Leaders
of various coalitions of victims groups in Lima indicated that CMAN often
°4
refused to meet with them, citing "a full agenda" as the excuse.'
For many, CMAN's focus on the rural victim reinforced the image of
the stereotypical victim: rural, uneducated, uninformed, and disorganized.
Victims began to share stories of the hostility of CMAN. One communication complained that CMAN's director had "minimal disposition to negoti102. Milagros Salazar, Porfin lilegan las reparacionespara vfctimas de violencia,
Feb. 3, 2011, available at www.ipsnoticias.net/print.asp?
idnews=97449.
103. Email from leader of Peruvian human rights organization (Jan. 10, 2011
(7:05 p.m.)) (discussing concerns) (on file with author).
104. Email from leader of Peruvian human rights organization (Jan. 25, 2011
(9:18 a.m.)) (on file with author).
INTER PRESS SERVICE,
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ate and consult the victims' organizations."' 0 5 They said he even seemed to
not know about their organizations. Moreover, he told them that reparations
were an "administrative decision" and thus a "unilateral" decision of the
state. Significantly, they acknowledged that this attitude left them feeling
unrepaired and undignified, undermining the symbolic aspect of
reparations.
Despite this exclusionary approach, the victims, working in coordination with local human rights organizations, remained persistent in presenting their own proposals. For example, they suggested that any package
should resemble economic reparations portfolios awarded in the past, such
as those granted to "Ronderos," the self-defense committees who fought in
the conflict' 0 6 or those distributed pursuant to judgments of the Inter-American Court. Such yardsticks, they asserted, would reflect the value of treating
victims in a uniform, fair manner. Alternatively, they suggested a base
amount reflecting the "salario vital" (minimum wage) for the duration of
the twenty-year conflict. 0 7 CMAN's initial reaction was to declare these
proposals unrealistic and "sobredimenscionada" (too extensive). The
CMAN director contested the amount by pointing out that the average income of those in rural areas was much less than this amount, and that the
average span of time would vary depending on when a given person's moment of "victimization" occurred.
The limited consultation with these victims groups only heightened
their anxiety as they waited for the Technical Commission's report to be
issued. They worried about the amount the Commission would choose, how
it would be distributed, and who would benefit. In particular, they expressed concern that the Commission appeared to operate within a purely
economic framework: whether there was sufficient funding in the budget.
The victims noted that economics, while an important consideration, should
not be the determining factor. Rather, ethical and moral principles required
that reparations be "dignificatorias"-helping to restore the dignity of the
beneficiary, consistent with the symbolic quotient.
CMAN finally issued its technical report toward the end of February
2011. Observing that reparation efforts are "just, necessary and appropriate
for a democratic state that respects rights," the report recognized that repa105. Email from leader of Peruvian human rights organization (June 2, 2011
(12:30 p.m.)) (on file with author).
106. See generally Jemima Garcia-Godos, Victim Reparations in the Peruvian
Truth Commission and the Challenge of HistoricalInterpretation,2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 63 (2008).
107. See El GobiernoAprob6 Aumento del SalarioMinimo Vital a 600 Soles, EL
COMERCIO, Nov. 10, 2010, available at http://elcomercio.pe/economia/666923/noticiagobierno-aprobo-aumento-salario-minimo-vital-600-soles.
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rations should be designed to "return the person to the situation [that existed] prior to the violation, to establish the family's social and economic
life." 10 8 At the same time, it acknowledged that "[g]iven that it is nearly
impossible to evaluate the damage suffered by each individual given the
massive (widespread) victimization, we are opting for an indirect method of
evaluation." 109 This direct juxtaposition of legal principle and pragmatic
consideration exemplifies the typical scenario of what I call "compromised
justice" in transitional justice reparation programs. It was the government's
initial failure to attend to the participatory quotient in the process of determining the "content" of the right to reparation that signaled the beginning
of tensions with rights-holders, who did not recognize any of their own
suggestions in the government's proposals. The PIR beneficiaries did not,
however, outright reject the government's proposals. Significantly, they instead began to bargain within the government's proposed parameters.
D.

Negotiating the Content of the Right to Reparation

Victims' organizations began to meet and discuss the technical study,
and whether they agreed with it or not. The general reaction of victims
related to broader principles of truth and justice and the objection that the
plan did not reflect their needs or demands. While there were some general
pronouncements from victims' groups regarding their dissatisfaction with
the report, 1 0 others offered more specific feedback. Some regional groups,
for example, noted that they preferred one disbursement of benefits (una
sola armada),but if budget constraints prohibited this approach they would
accept fifty percent of it followed by monthly payments."' They rejected
108. Lineamientos t6cnicos y metologias para la determinaci6n de los montos,
procedimientos y modalidades de pago que deberdin regir la implementaci6n del
Programa de Reparaci6n Econ6micas [Technical and methodological guidelines for determining the amounts, procedures and modalities of payment for implementing the
program of economic reparations], Oficio No. 005-201 I-PCMICT (Dec. 3, 2011) [here-

inafter Technical Study] (on file with author).
109. Id. (author's translation).
110. Beatriz Jim6nez, Keiko debe disculparsecon los familiaresde los asesinados
por el gobierno de su padre, EL MUNDO, Apr. 29, 2011, available at http://www.
elmundo.es/america/2011/04/29/noticias/! 304034539.html

11l. Email from Peruvian lawyer working with a human rights organization (Mar.
21, 2011 (2:08 p.m.)) (on file with author). The technical study offers a few approaches
to disbursement, including the provision of a single fixed amount, the offer of gradual
payments, like a pension, over a period of no more than five years, or, alternatively, a

lump sum of 50% followed by disbursement of the remainder in monthly payments.
The report indicates that the manner of distribution would ultimately depend on the
available budget. Technical Study, supra note 108.
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any indicia that looked like anti-poverty measures, arguing that such indicia
confused reparations with rural development obligations. For example, they
contested the Technical Commission's reliance on a purely agrarian measure, the "Sierra productiva-el paquete tecnol6gico," which in essence is a
measure used to address poverty and promote rural development. Amounting to 7,100 Peruvian soles (roughly $2700), it did not reflect the real cost
of living in urban centers.
Victims' groups also called into question the use of "a minimum salary
for an average family" ("el ingreso familiar per capita") multiplied by five
years, a length of time estimated by CMAN to reflect the amount of time
necessary to reestablish one's prior situation. The estimation included two
years for recuperating from the immediate impact of any trauma suffered,
and three years for reestablishing one's normal economic activities. 12 They
questioned how the Commission determined "five" as the number of years
it takes to recover from a human rights violation. Instead, they proposed a
ten year time frame as the average period of "affectation"-a length they
believed more closely represented their own realities. CMAN tried to justify
its calculation based on its earlier polling, saying that beneficiaries indicated they would be satisfied with 10,000 soles (approximately $3,700).
Yet, the victims and their advocates pointed out that in fact the majority of
those polled had indicated a preferred amount in the range of 90,000 to
150,000 soles (approximately $33,600 to $56,000). 113 Significantly, the victims appeared ready to accept an amount between the two extremes.
Interestingly, none of the public announcements by victims groups
seemed to outright reject the terms of the technical study; rather, they signaled a willingness to work within the government's methodology, even
while being critical of it. In effect, victim groups' first response was to
engage in a process of negotiation, accepting already deeply compromised
parameters for reparations. Thus, even with minimal space for participation,
the victims appeared sensitized to the practical limits of an administrative
reparation program.
At this point the government stood at an important juncture. It could
engage with victims' counter-proposals through a process of deliberative
consultation and grant some concessions in the bargaining process. Certainly, the posture of victims signaled that they were amenable to compromise. While there would inevitably be some victims who would complain
112. "Sin embargo, para efectos de intentar contabilizar la pdrdida econ6mica
sufrida, se estima que al menos se requieren de cinco afios para restablecer la situaci6n
previa al dafto: Dos para recuperarse del impacto inmediato del trauma y tres para restablecer sus actividades econ6micas habituales." Technical Study, supra note 108.
113. Interview with Correa, supra note 22.
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that they did not feel represented by those negotiating on their behalf, the
majority appeared willing to accept compromise.
Recognizing this pivotal moment, the human rights activists accompanying the victims made a concerted effort to lobby CMAN not only to reconsider some of the technical aspects of its proposed amount, but also to
guarantee that the ultimate decision would be made in full consultation with
the victims. Significantly, the Reparations Council, whose only job was to
register victims, issued a press release imploring CMAN to be more participatory, expressing concern that the technical study did not appear to
have taken into consideration the "voz de las victimas" (voice of the victims), who should be fully involved in developing the criteria for reparations used to calculate amounts, procedures and modalities of economic
reparations." 14 The Council pointed out that "consultation and victim acceptance" is "a process that has a truly reparative effect and which will be
' 5
viewed as legitimate by the affected population." "
E.

Missed Opportunity Spells Rejection

Ultimately, CMAN failed to seize the moment and take a turn toward
meaningful consultation with the victims. According to victims' reports, the
CMAN director reacted with hostility, outright rejecting counter-offers
while arguing that reparations were not obligatory and the amounts were
not up for debate given that they reflect an administrative decision. He also
said the only reason victims would receive reparations at all was thanks to
his underappreciated efforts." 16 His response deflated the notion that victims
should be treated as equal citizens and rights bearers, and instead were at
the whim of a paternalistic benefactor. One victim leader described a meeting with the CMAN director involving fifteen representatives of twelve regions, reporting that "fuimos ninguneados," an idiomatic expression
' 17
conveying the sense of being made to feel like "nobodies." "
The CMAN director went so far as to make an unsavory comparison,
pointing out that a victim's life would not have improved even if there had
been no violation. For example, a child whose parents were killed or disappeared would be in the same condition as his neighbor who suffered no
114. Consejo de Reparaciones, Consejo de Reparaciones emite opinidn sobre la
propuesta de reparaciones econ6micas, Oficio No. 027-2011-PCM-CR/P (Apr. 1,
2011), available at http://www.ruv.gob.pe/noticias_104.html.
115. "La consulta y aceptaci6n de las vfctimas" es "un proceso con un efecto
realmente reparador y que goce de legitimidad entre la poblaci6n afectada." Id.
116. Interview with victim (Hartford, CT, U.S.A.) (Oct. 12, 2011).
117. Email from leader of a victim-survivor group in Peru (June 8, 2011 (5:33
p.m.)) (on file with author).
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such loss in the war. His comment implied that even if the victims had the
opportunity to present evidence of incurred losses they would often lack
proof of deserving reparations. This comment reflects a profound lack of
appreciation of the symbolic import of reparations-the importance of recognizing not only the responsibility of the State, jbut also the mental suffering that victims endured, which may not be neatly presented in receipts and
absent pay slips. Perhaps most significant is how the CMAN director failed
to appreciate how the very process of negotiating reparations is a symbolic
form of reparations.
F.

The Waitfor ReparativeJustice

Given that CMAN's proposals did not reflect their demands, the victims viewed them as lacking legitimacy. Moreover, they saw the amounts as
reflecting new forms of discrimination. Given the overall situation, the victims decided to stop negotiating altogether, and wait it out until the next
government. Indeed, when it became evident that there was no room for
negotiating with the incumbent president's administration, victims' organizations took the approach of redirecting their lobbying actions toward the
impending presidential elections. This included writing letters to candidates, especially to Ollanta Humala, whose party was one of the few to
mention the subject of reparations in his written platform.
Despite the strategic plan to outwait the government, the incumbent
administration had its own trick up its sleeve: President Garcia announced
that his government would soon begin to pay reparations to those who had
suffered "as a result of terrorism. ' 18 This descriptive terminology reflected
a decision to disassociate reparations with state responsibility for human
rights violations, understanding them instead as a gesture of help for those
unfortunate enough to be negatively impacted by terrorism. Immediately,
the symbolic importance of acknowledgment was lost.
Significantly, the Reparations Council sent a letter to one victim leader
in what could only be viewed as an attempt to apologize for the overall
reparation process. 119 In this public letter, the Council refers to the importance of coordinating with victims, recognizing that the regulations issued
to implement the PIR law themselves embody the principle of participation.
Article 7 of the regulations indeed recognize the right of victims to participate "in the decision-making and definition of their own processes of social,
118. Alan Garcia: Apoyari al pr6ximo gobierno porque es mi obligacidn', EL
COMERCIO, June 2, 2011, availableat http://elcomercio.pe/politica/767733/noticia-alan-

garcia-apoyare-al-proximo-gobierno-porque-mi-obligacion.
119. Letter from Consejo de Reparaciones, Oficio No. 043-2011-PCM-CR/P, to
victim leader (June 8, 2011) (on file with author).
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cultural, economic and material construction and reconstruction, through a
process of dialogue and consultation that assumes the incorporation and development of the involved population."' 120 The Council rightly recognized
that ongoing and meaningful consultation with victim-survivors is not only
required by law, but also presents an important opportunity to include a
12
historically excluded population in political decisions. '
In June 2011, the government issued a resolution to begin the reparation process. It declared that each victim would be entitled to 10,000 soles,
and that the registration process would officially close at the end of December 2011.122 The rejection by victims' organizations was immediate and unequivocal. They began sending out signed letters uniformly rejecting the
resolution, calling it an insult and, as one victim-rights activist termed it,
"[l]a degradaci6n como reparaci6n" (degradation as reparation). 23 Such
groups viewed the government as plenty generous with big businesses, giving them all kinds of strategic subsidies, yet offering individual economic
reparations for human rights violations that are "an insult to the dignity of
victims."'' 24 It was even highlighted that the CMAN director makes 15,000
125
soles a month, a salary that comes from the taxes of victim-survivors.
They pointed out that for elderly persons, especially those who are
sick, or for large families, this amount will hardly make a difference in their
lives. The reparation did not contemplate the very point of reparations: to
compensate what was lost. The victims lamented that the amount did not
contemplate the loss of life opportunities (proyecto de vida), the loss of
animals and homes, and, above all else, the loss of lives that could never be
120. "En la toma de decisiones y definiciones de sus propios procesos de construcci6n y reconstrucci6n social, cultural, y material mediante un proceso de dialogo y
consulta que presupone incorporar y desarrollar las sugerencias de la poblaci6n involucrado." Id.
121. "Seguimos creyendo que la consulta a la poblaci6n afectada por la violencia
constituye, ademis de un imperativo de la Ley, una oportunidad para incluir en las
decisiones polfticas a quienes hist6ricamente han sido excluidos. En consecuencias,
deseo animarla a continuar en la btisqueda de dicho reconocimiento, camino en el cual
puede contar con el apoyo de los integrantes del Consejo de Reparaciones." Id.
122. Decreto Supremo que establece el plazo de conclusi6n del Proceso de
determinaci6n e identificaci6n de los beneficiarios del Programa de Reparaciones
Econ6micas y la oportunidad de otorgamiento de las reparaciones econ6micas, Decreto
Supremo No. 051-2011-PCM (June 18, 2011), availableat http://www.scribd.com/doc/
58315586/Decreto-Supremo-051-2001 -PCM-sobre-Reparaciones-Economicas-aVictimas.
123. Heeder Soto, La degradacidn como reparacidn, KAus JUSTA (June 17,
2011), http://kausajusta.blogspot.com/2011/06/la-degradacion-como-reparacion.html.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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returned. One queried "How much does a life cost? How much does lost
property cost? How much does family happiness cost? How much does the
absence of a loved one cost? '

126

He questioned why victim-survivors would

receive so little compared to other groups who had received reparations
(like the self-defense committees), 127 and answered his own inquiry: "Because the majority of victims are farmers who live in extreme poverty and
1 28
are considered third class citizens."
Above all else was the critique that the new law did not reflect international standards on the right to reparation. As one victim pointed out: "We
are not asking for a handout, this is our right."' 129 Victim groups also recognized that the proposal disregarded the concept of consultation and negotiation with the beneficiaries. As one victim aptly put it:
Reparations are a means for the victims to exercise their citizen rights
that were violated during the period of political violence. Thus, reparations are not satisfied merely by awarding compensation through
goods and/or services. To deny victims their citizen rights is to return
them to the conditions of marginalization, disrespect and discrimination. It is re-victimization.

30

The Institute for Legal Defense, a human rights organization that has represented victims throughout the last several decades, reported that the law
was far from reparatory and failed to close wounds. Instead, it "represents a
mistreatment of the victims, a lack of understanding and little capacity for
' 13
dialogue." 1
126. ",Cudnto cuesta esta vida? , Cudnto cuesta aquellos bienes, que han perdido?
4,Cuinto cuesta la felicidad que tenfan, con el familia? ZCudinto cuesta la ausencia del
victimado, en la farnilia? iCudnto cuesta la educaci6n perdido de los hijos de la victimado?" Id.
127. Id.
128. 4"Porque la mayorfa de las vfctimas son campesino, viven en la extrema
pobreza; considerados ciudadanos de tercera categorfa?" Id.
129. "No estamos pidiendo una dddiva este es un derecho que nos corresponde."
Victimas y familiares de la violencia exigen la derogaci6ndel DS 051-2011 - PCM,
AsocIACON PRO DERECHOS HUMANOS,

http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/index.php?option=

corn_content&view=article&id=96:tragedy-troubles-angels&catid=38:sports/.
130. "La reparaci6n es una medida que busca que las victimas puedan ejercer sus
derechos ciudadanos que fueron vulnerados durante el periodo de violencia polftica. Por
esto, las reparaciones no se agotan con ]a daci6n de las compensaciones a trav6s de
bienes y/o servicios. Pretender negar los derechos que como ciudadanos tienen las vfctimas, es volver a colocarlos en condiciones de marginaci6n, desprecio y discriminaci6n. Es la re victimizaci6n misma." Id.
131. "Lejos de ser reparadoras y cerrar heridas, representan un maltrato a las vfctimas, una falta de entendimiento y muy poca capacidad de didlogo." Pronunciamiento:
Se debe derogarDecreto Supremo sobre las reparacionesecondmicas a las victimas de
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It did not go unnoticed that the new law was announced only forty-five
days from the end of the president's term and promoted as "buena acci6n"
(good work) to perhaps favor Garcia's bid for presidency in 2016. In fact,
soon after the issuance of the resolution, the press captured pictures of the
government handing out giant checks in the poorest regions, targeting the
poor farmers. In Good Housekeepingsweepstake style, the gesture confused
populations who often accepted the money lacking a proper understanding
of what they were receiving and why-a feat described by one commentator as "a vile deception."' 3 2 Yet for the purposes of the general population-far removed from the world of human rights and the post truth
commission process-the government may have appeared to be fulfilling
its obligation to repair.
Indeed, mainstream press reports covered the ceremony and quoted
Minister Rosario Fernandez as saying:
[A]ny compensation will always be partial because the lost lives will
never be returned. The economic reparation program does not try to
replace these lost lives, which have no monetary price, but is rather
an effort of the government to help those who suffered as a result of
133
the terrorist violence.
Reflected in her comment and terminology is the lack of recognition that
the government also caused much of this violence through state terrorism.
In so doing, the full symbolic import of the economic reparations was lost.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Peru's recent experience with the implementation of economic reparations presents important lessons for governments attempting to repair past
human rights violations. This Article has proposed two ways in which Peruvian government might have avoided the re-victimization of the intended
beneficiaries of its reparation program: namely the inclusion of the participatory and symbolic quotients in the design and implementation of their
reparation program. While these approaches will not prevent or resolve all
political tensions, they will, I contend, help governments preserve the reparative effects of reparation programs and deepen democratic habits.

la violencia polftica, INSTITUTO DE DEFENSA LEGAL (June 17, 2011), http://www.idl.
org.pe/notihome/notihome01 .php?noti=191.
132. Email from Peruvian leader of victim-survivor group (June 29, 2011 (7:26
p.m.)) (on file with author).
133. Jefa del Gabinete entrega reparacionesindividuales, EL PERUANO (July 17,
2011).
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That said, despite the ameliorative effects of the participatory and symbolic quotients, they are not sufficient for establishing clear international
guidelines and criteria for defining the content of reparation policy, includ134
ing fair and adequate parameters and modalities of economic reparations.
This important task still demands attention. Moreover, it is important to
highlight that strengthening the participation of beneficiaries requires serious commitment. This is true not only with respect to creating space for
their meaningful engagement in the process, but also with respect to providing needed technical support to build their individual and organizational
capacity to assume more agency in the reparation process. The challenges
inherent in promoting and guaranteeing processes of participation are great
and need to be carefully considered in implementing a participatory-focus
to reparations. 135 In the end, this commitment and investment in the capabilities of victim-survivors may be one of the most important, although often
overlooked, reparative focuses of a transitional justice process.
134. There are some efforts to offer direction in the development of such guidelines. See, e.g., Cristidn Correa, Making Concrete a Message of Inclusion: Reparations
for Victims of Massive Crimes, in

VICTIMOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL

185 (Rianne, Monique Letschert et al. eds., 2011); Heidi Rombouts &
Stef Vandeginste, Reparationfor victims in Rwanda: Caught between theory andpractice, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 309 (K. De Feyter et al. eds., 2005).
135. See generally Mental Health Reparations,supra note 19, at 136; Correa et
al., supra note 41.
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